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B y  Ralph E. Drexel and Howard N. H u n t e r  
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SUMMARY 
The development of the crew-couch/restra.int system and the crew load-attenuation 
system for the Apollo command module resulted in a significant advancement in the state 
of the art .  During the Apollo Program, changes in program requirements caused 
a change in system requirements. These changes, together with research and testing, 
resulted in the design and flight of various couch, restraint, and attenuation systems. 
The pre-Apollo impact-loading restraint philosophy dictated a requirement for 
complete restraint and support of the body that resulted in cumbersome straps and mas- 
sive, individually contoured couches. The development effort for the Apollo Program 
resulted in a couch that accommodates all size crewmen, is self-adjusting to the con- 
tour of the crewman, and can be disassembled, folded, and reassembled in flight by a 
suited crewman without the use of tools. The restraint system that was developed for 
the Apollo Program is a six-point suspension system incorporating an easily actuated 
single-point release. This couch/restraint system allows the crewman the necessary 
mobility for spacecraft operations and affords him adequate restraint during landing 
impact. 
The load attenuators available during the early stages of the Apollo Program met 
the specified spacecraft requirements, but could not meet the controlled-load and 
reversible-stroke requirements of the final Apollo Program definitions. The couch 
load-attenuation system developed for the spacecraft to protect the crewman primarily 
during land landing uses two methods of energy absorption: friction and two forms of 
cyclic deformation of material. The spacecraft couch load-attenuation system is com- 
pact, will absorb energy in both compression and tension stroking, and can be cycled 
with an accumulative life of approximately 100 inches of stroking without load degrada- 
tion. The long stroking life and repeatability of the load levels made possible a pre- 
acceptance load/stroke test that allowed the determination of the actual stroking load 
value before installation in the spacecraft. 
The Apollo crew-couch/restraint system was designed to support and restrain 
three crewmen during all phases of the mission from launch to landing. The load- 
attenuation system was designed to control the impact loads imposed on the crew during 
landing, and to remain nonfunctional during any other phase of the mission. 
The functional and physical design requirements, the evolution of the design, and 
the command module (CM) interfaces of the crew-couch/restraint and load-attenuation 
systems a re  discussed in this report. A brief description of the systems and some of 
the problems encountered during development and flight a r e  also included. 
The development of the crew-couch/restraint and load-attenuation system was a 
5-year effort. During this time, philosophies and program requirements changed which 
resulted in different generations of equipment and in the use of more than one design in 
the program. 
DES I GN REQU I REMENTS 
The following a re  the final design requirements for the Apollo crew-couch/ 
restraint and load-attenuation system. Since all the requirements were not imposed 
initially or recognized in the early stages of the Apollo Program, the evolution of the 
design and requirements is described in the text. The abort mission requirement of 
land landing the CM had the greatest influence on finalizing the crew-couch/restraint 
and load-attenuation system requirements. 
Couch 
Final design requirements for the Apollo crew-couch/restraint system are  as  
follows. 
1. Support: The couch shall support the crewman during all mission phases. 
2. Restraint: The crewman shall be restrained, when necessary, during the 
mission. 
3. Mobility: The crewman shall be allowed adequate freedom, while restrained, 
to perform spacecraft operations. 
4. Accommodation: The couch shall accommodate any size crewman between 
the 10th- and 90th-percentile dimensions a s  defined in reference 1. No tools o r  special 
equipment shall be required for positioning the couch during flight. 
5. Operation: Operation of the couch shall be compatible with a crewman in a 
pressurized space suit. 
6. Disassembly: The couch shall be foldable and stowable in flight to increase 
the interior working volume of the CM for mission operations. 
7. Strength: Structurally, the couch shall be adequate to support a crewman 
under loads imposed by the attenuator system. 
At tenuators  
Final design requirements for the Apollo load-attenuation system are  as  follows. 
1. Stroking level: The stroking level of the attenuators shall limit the loads im- 
posed on the crewman during landing. The attenuators shall not allow the couch to 
move during any mission phase other than landing. 
2. Stroking distance : The attenuators shall absorb the landing energy transmitted 
to the couch within the stroking distance allowed in the CM. 
3. Reversibility : The attenuators shall absorb energy in both tension and com- 
pression stroking. 
DESI GN CONSI DERATIONS 
Although support and restraint of the crewmen during all mission phases was a 
primary couch requirement for Project Mercury and for the Gemini and Apollo Pro- 
grams, some program differences that influenced the design and development of the 
couch and load-attenuation systems did exist. The differences in the program require- 
ments a r e  listed in the following paragraphs. 
1. Mobility: Mobility within the spacecraft was not a requirement in Project 
Mercury and the Gemini Program. In the Apollo Program, an intravehicular mobility 
requirement made i t  necessary to design a folding couch. 
2. Launch abort: In both Project Mercury and the Apollo Program, an escape 
tower was provided for separation of the spacecraft from the booster in the event of a 
launch abort, during which the crewmen would remain in the spacecraft. In the Gemini 
Program, individual ejection seats were provided for pad and low-altitude aborts. 
3. Landing: Although all three programs had a primary water-landing capability, 
design of the Mercury and Apollo spacecraft required incorporation of a secondary 
land-landing capability in  case of a pad or  very-low-altitude abort. Landing-load at- . 
tenuation was provided externally on the Mercury capsule, but i t  was provided internally 
on the Apollo CM. The requirement for a land-landing capability with internal attenua- 
tion was a primary factor in the design of the Apollo couch load-attenuation system. 
The orientation of the couch, restraint, and attenuation systems within the CM is 
shown in figure 1. 
Y-Y struts 1 
bearing plate 
Figure 1. - Orientation of the CM crew- 
couch/restraint system. 
During the Apollo Program, two mis- 
sion designations were made, which resulted 
in  a Block I and a Block I1 CM. The Block I 
vehicle was used for an earth-orbital mis- 
sion only, and the Block I1 vehicle was used 
for the lunar-landing mission. The CM re- 
quirements were redefined for the Block 11 
mission, which resulted in a change in  
spacecraft equipment. The redefinition 
requirements resulted in changes to the 
crew -couch/restraint and load-attenuation 
systems design considerations that a re  iden- 
tified later in this report. 
Couch 
The Apollo Block I crew-couch assem- 
bly was required to provide comfortable 
support in  the proper operating position and, 
during all mission phases, to provide ade- 
quate restraint for crewmen in  both the 
ventilated- and pressurized-space-suit conditions. The crew-couch assembly was re- 
quired to allow inflight position adjustment for  all specified mission operating require- 
ments and to provide mounting space for rotational and translational flight controls. 
The original couch design was influenced strongly by the human factors (that is, 
size, reach, mobility), by the biodynamic requirements for impact protection, and by 
a lack of knowledge about the landing characteristics of the spacecraft. A requirement 
that the crewman must be restrained completely to survive the landing impact was dic- 
tated by these factors. A need for  further investigation of crew impact, with considera- 
tion given to spacecraft operational-requirement trade-offs, became evident from the 
couch design shown in figure 2. This design resulted from a study conducted by an in- 
dependent contractor very early in  the Apollo Program. The criterion used for the 
study was the existing human-impact-protection philosophy. The crew support and re- 
straint system that resulted from this study was entirely too cumbersome, complex, 
and massive. 
The f i rs t  prototype of the Apollo couch assembly, built by the prime contractor 
- to meet the early program requirements, is shown in  figure 3.  After a review of this 
couch, impairment of the inflight mobility of the crewman, both by the massiveness of 
the couch and by the complexity of the restraint harness, was apparent. 
As a result of the review, research and human-impact testing were conducted to 
maximize inflight crewman mobility and to maintain adequate impact protection. The 
results of human-impact testing reduced the requirement for complete restraint of the 
crewman within the deceleration loads specified for the Apollo CM crew couch. 
The advancement of the support and restraint philosophy resulted in changing the 
couch design from the individualized, contoured-seat concept that was used in the 
Figure 2. - Universal integrated couch/ 
restraint system. 
Figure 4. - Apollo unitized-couch 
flight design. 
Figure 3.  - Prototype Apollo unitized 
couch. 
Mercury and Gemini Programs to a univer- 
sa l  couch that would fit all crewmen between 
the 10th-and 90th-percentile sizes. With the 
new restraint requirements, the crew- 
couch/restraint system was redesigned to 
the configuration shown in figures 4 and 5 
(unitized couch) and was flown on the 
Apollo 7 mission. 
The Block II redefinition of the Apollo 
Program emphasized the requirement for 
more work volume in the CM to allow in- 
travehicular mobility and the requirement 
to open a center aisle for side-hatch extra- 
vehicular activity (EVA) by a suited crew- 
man wearing a portable life support system. 
Figure 5. - Restraint-harness com- 
ponents of the Apollo unitized 
couch. 
The side-hatch EVA requirement allows for 
a contingency return from the lunar module 
(LM) to the CM should a crewman not be 
able to return through the tunnel. Because 
these requirements could not be met with- 
out a major redesign of the unitized couch, 
a new couch that had minimum mechanical 
complexity but maximum flexibility was 
designed. The foldable couch (fig. 6) was 
developed and was used on all manned 
missions subsequent to the Apollo 7 
mission. 
A further review of the crew-couch 
requirements determined that the early re- 
quirement for the couch to translate the 
left- and right-hand crewmen from the 
launch positions to the docking window was 
not necessary. This requirement was de- 
leted in favor of the crewman moving him- 
self up to the docking window without the 
couch and then using the couch-restraint 
system to secure himself. Also, a s  a re- 
sult of the review, the crewman-operated 
foot-restraint system was deleted and re- 
placed with a passive heel restraint (fig. 7). 
Figure 6. - Apollo foldable-couch 
flight design. 
The elimination of the functions just 
described reduced the complexity of the 
crew-couch system. The passive heel re- 
straint design on the foldable couch elimi- 
nated inaccessible mechanisms in the 
Lot pan 
&nt retaining bar 
Figure 7. - Passive heel restraint. 
restraint system and resulted in increased crew safety. The passive heel restraint was 
incorporated on the unitized couch just before the launch of the Apollo 7 spacecraft. 
Translation of the man, instead of the couch, to the docking position was verified on the 
Apollo 7 mission because the Apollo 7 couch design allowed investigation of both methods. 
Installation tools were not needed for prelaunch installation of the foldable couch 
and, consequently, installation time was reduced from 4 hours to 1 hour. Because the 
couch was easy to remove and install, removal of the couch was permitted in the launch- 
readiness countdown to maximize the CM accessible interior and to minimize the time 
required for activities (such a s  stowage and repairs) inside the CM. 
Attenuators 
In the Apollo Program, the crew was protected from landing-impact loads by con- 
trolling only the loads imposed on the crewmen and the crew-couch/restraint system, 
not the loads imposed on the whole vehicle a s  in conventional craft. In other words, 
the landing gear was inside the vehicle. 
The requirements imposed on the attenuators were rather simple and direct. Be- 
cause the CM did not have any facilities for limiting the landing impact, the attenuators 
were required to provide support to the crew couch during all mission phases and to 
limit the energy transmitted to the crewman during landing impact. Also, the attenua- 
tors were limited to a stroking distance of 16 inches. 
The attenuators for the Block I CM were sized theoretically to produce the stroking 
g levels shown in figure 8 for a single-mass (man and couch) system. 
Various methods of energy absorption, such a s  metal cutting, metal bending, tube 
swaging, and hydraulics, were studied and tested in  an effort to meet the original Apollo 
Program requirements of load, stroke, and repeatability. The first load attenuator 
proposed for the Apollo CM was an aluminum-honeycomb-core concept (fig. 9). 
The honeycomb-attenuator load could be predicted only by testing samples from 
the same core of honeycomb that was used in the attenuator. Furthermore, the fric- 
tional forces of the brake, which was used for return strokes, decreased with time dnd 
were not predictable. The result was an attenuator with a questionable load level within 
large tolerances. This attenuator met the water-landing requirements of the Block I 
spacecraft and provided the lightest weight strut for the required load levels. Because 
the water-landing loads were lower than the high-g entry loads, shear pins were pro- 
vided to ensure that the attenuator would not stroke during entry. The attenuator de- 
sign remained relatively stable, but design of the lockout device was changed until a 
crew-operated design (fig. 10) was developed and flown on all missions except the 
Apollo 7 mission. The honeycomb attenuator was used in all axes on the Apollo 7 mis- 
sion and for the Y-axis only on all other missions. 
During the Block 11 redefinition, the 
decision was made to provide crew protec- 
tion for land landing because the location of 
the launch pad and the height of the vehicle 
resulted in a high probability of land landing 
during a pad or very-low-altitude abort. 
Because the CM could tumble during a land 
landing, a requirement for load attenuation 
in  both stroking directions was imposed. 
Piston 
/--Honeycomb /
Note: arrows denote the direction of the force applied to the man. 
Figure 8. - Block I load-attenuation 
levels. 
Figure 9. - Aluminum-honeycomb- core 
load attenuator . 
Attenuator piston (inner cylinder) 
+- 
0 
t ~ t t e n u a t o r  cylinder (outer) 
1 h /- Attenuator piston (inner wlinderl 
(a) Unlocked position. (b) Locked position. 
Figure 10. - Strut lockout. 
The higher energy levels of land landing and the limited stroking distance also resulted 
in a requirement for an attenuator that would stroke at a predictable level within close 
tolerance. 
A double-acting, repeatable attenuator (cyclic strut) (fig. 11) was developed that 
fulfilled the spacecraft land-landing criteria. The cyclic strut is based on a unique 
concept of cyclic deformation of metal to absorb energy (refs. 2 and 3). Simply stated, 
energy absorption is accomplished by rolling a ring of metal between two surfaces that 
a re  located less than the diameter of the ring apart, resulting in continual deformation 
of the ring as it  rolls. 
Because the cyclic strut is a constant-load device, load overshoot at the initial 
stroke of the strut (breakout) is an inherent problem. Because of the small difference 
between the strut load value necessary to meet the allowable stroking distance and the 
crew tolerance in the Z-axis, this overshoot could not be tolerated. 
The couch and man represent a two- 
mass system with the couch attached to the 
strut; therefore, the overshoot results in 
a secondary impact of the man on the couch. 
Because the couch mass is one-third of the 
total suspended mass, i t  does not impose a 
high enough load on the strut to initiate 
stroking; a s  a result, the man impacts the 
relatively stationary couch with approxi- 
mately the same velocity a s  the landing 
spacecraft. This secondary impact, 
coupled with the breakout load of the strut, 
results in a g level that is higher than the 
stroking level that is designed for a single- Figure 11. - Cyclic strut. mass system. Although this initial-impact 
g level was not considered dangerous, a softening of the secondary impact was desirable 
in the Z-axis to decrease the probability of spinal injury. 
To reduce the secondary impact level, couch stroking had to start before the sec- 
ondary impact. This early stroking of the couch was produced by controlling the onset 
rate of loading that was imposed on the couch system. A low-onset device was devel- 
oped to control the rate of loading (ref. 3). When this device was added to a Z-axis 
cyclic strut (fig. 12), the combination strut started stroking at a lower level than the 
pure cyclic strut, and the rate of loading 
from breakout to nominal stroke load was 
Washers controllable. With this application, the /- -Q.,A maximum load imposed on the crew was 
never higher thanthe nominal stroke load, 
and the secondary impact level was reduced. 
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  n 1 1 1 1 1 1  3 The low-onset device incorporates the con- 
I  I cept of metal-to-metal friction for energy 
absorption with the frictional load being in- 
Rings creased incrementally a s  the strut strokes. 
Figure 12. - Ramp-loaded attenuator Cyclic attenuators were used for the 
strut assembly. X-axis on all missions starting with the 
Apollo 8 mission. Cyclic attenuators were 
used for the Z-axis on the Apollo 8 and 9 
missions. On the Apollo 10 and subsequent missions, the Z-axis cyclic attenuator 
was replaced by the combination attenuator. 
SYSTEM DESCR I PTI ON 
Because of the changes in requirements for the Block I and Block I1 CM and be- 
cause different equipment was flown on the two command modules, a description of each 
system is presented. 
Block I, Apollo 7 Mission 
Couch. - The Block I couch consisted of a unitized, box-beam-construction, three- 
man plafform for the back support. The headrest and the seat/leg-pan assembly for 
each crewman were attached to this plafform. The body of the crewman was restrained 
by a six-point suspension restraint harness with a single-point-release system. An 
instep strap that was tightened and released by means of a mechanism actuated by a 
D-ring located on the seat pan (fig. 4) restrained the feet. This device was replaced 
by a passive heel restraint (fig. 7) just before the Apollo 7 mission. 
The Block I couch headrest was adjustable in flight for two conditions: pressur- 
ized suit and nonpressurized suit. Adjustment for crewman size had to be made on the 
ground before launch. Essentially, the seat/leg-pan assembly was a single unit that 
pivoted about the hip joint for couch ingress and egress. 
Attenuators. - The Block I attenuators consisted of a cylinder and a piston with an 
aluminum-honeycomb core placed between the piston and cylinder ends. The loads ap- 
plied to the piston rod were limited to the crushing strength of the honeycomb core, and 
energy was absorbed by material deformation. Because implementation of this concept 
would limit the load and would result in energy absorption in the initial stroking direc- 
tion only, a friction brake was installed on the X- and Z-axis attenuators to provide a 
limited amount of load attenuation for the return and subsequent stroking and to hold the 
couch stable after stroking. Because the Y-axis attenuators acted a s  bumpers between 
the couch and the CM sidewall and, therefore, stroked in one direction only, a friction 
brake was not required. 
To prevent stroking during high-g entries that would result in attenuator loads 
. higher than the stroking load, a passive lockout was installed. The initial couch load- 
ing had to be higher than the breakout level of the lockout before the attenuator would 
stroke. 
Block I I ,  Apollo 8 and Subsequent Missions 
Couch. - The Block I1 couch consisted of three individual body supports that were 
attached by pip pins and clamps to a supporting framework. The body supports could be 
folded at the hip joint and knee joint, had provisions for locking the seat pan at two 
angles other than that of the folded position, were capable of being folded at approxi- 
mately the shoulder position, and could be detached from the framework for storage 
(fig. 13). The body supports also could be detached and folded in flight by a crewman 
in a pressurized space suit. As in the case of side-hatch EVA, the center body support 
is detached and stowed under the couch of the spacecraft commander. The headrest 
was adjustable in flight for any size crewman and for any pressure-suit condition. The 
backpan portion of the body support was constructed of Teflon-coated fiber glass, which 
would conform to the crewman for comfortable support. Restraint of the crewman was 
the same a s  in the Apollo 7 couch with the six-point harness and the passive heel 
restraint. 
Attenuators. - The Block I1 attenuators (X- and Z-axis) were double-acting or 
cyclic struts that used the concept of material deformation in the plastic range to 
achieve energy absorption. Material is deformed by rolling a ring of metal (reaction 
ring) between an inner and outer tube (fig. 11). When the space between the tubes is 
less than the diameter of the ring, the ring is forced out of round, thus absorbing energy 
a s  i t  rolls. Because the ring is free to roll in either direction, load attenuation occurs 
. for compression, for tension, and at  any position of the strut. The reaction load was 
controlled by varying the number of reaction rings installed. Heat-treated, high- 
strength bearing rings a r e  located at each end of the gang of reaction rings to maintain 
. concentricity of the tubes and to control the deflection of the reaction rings. The final 
design of the cyclic strut was held to a breakout load of 10 percent over nominal and a 
stroking load of ~t 5 percent of nominal. 
For the Apollo 10 and subsequent missions, the Z-axis cyclic attenuator was re- 
placed by a combination cyclic attenuator, which was basically a cyclic attenuator in 
combination with a low-onset device. The low-onset device consists of a slender, hard 
rod of very uniform diameter onto which a series of washers has been pressed. The 




For EVA egress and ingress 
Figure 13. - Foldable-couch flight positions. 
deformed plastically and thereby maintaining a squeeze on the rod. When the washer 
is forced to slide along the rod, drag occurs from metal-to-metal friction and energy 
is absorbed. 
The total load (or total energy consumed) is the cumulative effect of all the wash- 
e r s  stroking along the rod. If spaces a re  left between the washers, the load is in- 
creased each time a washer is picked up and pushed along the rod. This incremental 
loading produces an approximate ramp function of the applied force, which, for a given 
mass, reduces the deceleration-onset rate. Thus, the deceleration-onset rate of a 
mass can be controlled by selecting the appropriate washer spacing, and the magnitude 
of the deceleration can be controlled by selecting the proper number of washers. Char- 
acteristic load curves for the cyclic strut and combined strut a re  shown in figures 14 
and 15, respectively. The ramp-loading effect is produced only during the initial 
stroke of the attenuator, and the attenuator remains a lower level cyclic attenuator for 
subsequent stroking. 
Because a reversible loading in the Y-axis for the Block I1 vehicle was not needed, 




Figure 14. - Cyclic-strut load/time Figure 15.- Combined cyclic-strut and 
characteristic. low-onset-device load/time 
characteristic. 
TEST PROGRAMS 
The following types of tests were conducted on the crew-couch/restraint and load- 
attenuation systems. 
Basic-Cri ter ia  Tests 
Couch. - Before the couch could be designed, certain basic questions had to be 
answered. Crew/couch interface exercises were conducted to determine the couch size 
that was required to accommodate a crewman in either a pressurized or  a ventilated 
space suit. The location of armrests, hand-controller supports, headrests, and 
restraint-harness attachments and routings had to be determined. In addition, the 
couch had to accommodate men ranging in size from the 10th to the 90th percentile with 
a minimum of adjustments. Also, a s  part of the basic criteria, human-impact tests 
were necessary to determine seat angles, methods of restraint, and the g-level toler- 
ance of humans in various directions for the proposed designs. 
Before a design could be completed, crewman/couch/spacecraft interface tests 
. were required to determine the mobility of the crewman inside the spacecraft with the 
couch installed and to determine the capability of the crewman to operate all couch con- 
trols and to perform the functions necessary for folding and dismantling the couch. 
Attenuators. - The basic design requirement for attenuators is a determination of 
the load level at which the strut must stroke. This load level is determined from the 
human tolerance resulting from the couch design coupled with the attenuator geometry 
within the spacecraft and from the distance the strut is allowed to stroke within the 
spacecraft. With the basic design requirement in mind, attenuator concepts were re- 
viewed and tested to determine the design that had the best functional performance and 
the smallest weight-to- load ratio. 
Development Tests 
Couch. - The development testing of the crew couch consisted primarily of 
component-structural tests, life-cycle tests, and crew-interface tests. As a result of 
development testing, some design changes were incorporated. The most significant of 
these changes were the heel restraint and the headrest. 
The snap-in-type heel restraint used on the Gemini spacecraft was determined to 
be inadequate for the Apollo load conditions and was redesigned to a side-entry, slide- 
in-type heel restraint that offered better retention. The slide-in-type heel-restraint 
concept also has been employed in the Skylab Program for restraining a crewman 
during extravehicular work. 
The large, foldable-type headrest that was used on the early Apollo couch was re- 
designed to a low-profile-type headrest that reduced interference with the crewman 
during ingress and egress. 
Attenuators . - During the development of the cyclic attenuators, test results 
proved (1) that the inner and outer tubes had to be sized properly to obtain the exact 
amount of squeeze on the rings to prevent slippage or fatigue, (2) that parts had to be 
held to very close tolerances to obtain a constant load/stroke curve, (3) that the ring 
and tube surfaces had to be grit blasted to prevent any slippage, and (4) that spacers 
separating the rings had to be incorporated to prevent interference between the rings. 
Results of the corrosion-contaminants test proved that, although the materials used 
were stainless steel, the attenuators had to be sealed to prevent corrosion. A flexible 
fluorocarbon boot seal that tore away at a force of 100 pounds was designed for the 
moving end of the attenuator. The attenuator was flushed with nitrogen, and the boot 
was installed in a 100-percent-nitrogen atmosphere. Also, the seal kept out foreign 
particles that might have interfered with the rolling rings. 
One significant program milestone was the availability of a complete CM to per- 
form a series of drop tests to understand better the CM dynamics and the dynamics of 
the couch and attenuation system within the CM. The understanding of the dynamics 
and test simulation on a drop tower with a 
full couch/attenuator system permitted re- 
finement of the initial-impact load to an 
acceptable rate of acceleration for crew 
tolerance. 
The final load/stroke design curve 
for the low-onset device is shown in fig- 
ure 16. The load-attenuation levels for 
each axis flight struts a r e  shown in fig- 
ure 17. 
By using the land-landing g-time 
curves that were determined from the full- 
scale-CM impact tests, a series of drop- 
tower tests with the complete couch/ 
attenuation system was performed to de- 


















Figure 16. - Ramp-loading device 
load/stroke curve. 
Note: arrows denote the direction of the force applied h the man. 
Figure 17. - Block 11 load-attenuation 
levels. 
that would result in the lowest g level for 
the crewman within the stroking distance 
allowed in the CM. Results of the full- 
system drop tests were invaluable in deter- 
mining the attenuator load value that was 
required for the spacecraft, that is, tuning 
the system. A comparison of figure 17 to 
figure 8 reveals the reduction in load im- 
posed on the crew that was accomplished. 
Because the ramp- loading assembly 
was essentially a friction device, a number 
of tests had to be conducted to determine 
the proper lubricant to be used in assembly. 
As a friction device, the assembly was ve- 
locity sensitive, and development stroke- 
load tests were programed carefully to 
produce the proper velocity/time profile. 
Certification Tests 
Couch. - The CM impact tests and the 
full-system drop tests were invaluable in 
certifying the crew couch. Structurally, the couch was designed to the early theoretical 
attenuator loads when applied statically, but structural failures of the couch were en- 
countered when impact tests were conducted at those theoretical values. Because the 
attenuator loads were reduced as  a result of the full-scale tests, the decision was made 
to certify the couch to the actual attenuator loads instead of incorporating design changes 
that would have been required to satisfy the theoretical loads. 
Attenuators. - The major certification requirement for the attenuators was to 
certify that the attenuators would function at the levels established in the full-scale drop 
tests. Certification was accomplished by stroking each attenuator in both tension and 
compression on a load/stroke machine and by verifying that the attenuators stroked 
within * 5 percent of the nominal load value. 
FL I GHT EXPER I ENCE 
The CM crew-couch/restraint system has functioned satisfactorily during launch, 
flight, entry, water- landing, and recovery operations. The folding, stowing, and re- 
assembling of the couch in flight have been achieved without problems on all missions 
except the Apollo 9 mission. The Apollo 9 crewmen experienced some difficulty in 
reassembling the center body support of the couch. This difficulty proved to be a couch 
installation problem. When the couch was installed, clearance between the Y-axis- 
attenuator rubbing pads and the CM sidewalls did not allow for the change in the CM 
shape in orbit. The decrease in the distance between the CM sidewalls after launch 
caused a pinching action on the couch structure, making reassembly difficult. A couch- 
sidewall clearance of 0.040 inch was adequate to eliminate this problem. 
No occasion has arisen during any Apollo flight for an evaluation of the CM crew- 
couch/restraint and load-attenuation systems under abort o r  land-landing conditions. 
The two-parachute water landing of the Apollo 15 CM resulted in sufficient crewman/ 
couch loading to stroke the X-axis foot attenuators 0.1 inch. From analysis of data 
derived from the design qualification and attenuator acceptance tests, an acceleration 
*of at  least 15g on the crew was determined to cause the strut to stroke. 
CONCLUDI NG REMARKS 
The most difficult couch-development problem was the compromise that had to be 
made to provide adequate crew protection for a land landing and to satisfy the operational 
requirements, simultaneously. The couch, restraint, and attenuation interfaces in- 
volved controls and displays, pressure- suit connections, helmet and boot- heel designs, 
human tolerances to impact loads in all directions, human tolerance to prolonged 
eyeballs-in (forward) acceleration, stowage-compartment configurations to accommo- 
date couch motions on impact, rapid emergency egress for pad abort, inflight stowage 
for access to the lower equipment bay, and structural integrity for flight and abort 
conditions. 
The use of a full-scale vehicle to determine the landing dynamics of the total 
couch/attenuation/vehicle system proved to be invaluable in tuning a crew impact- load 
attenuation system to protect the crewman adequately. 
The interface problems that must be considered in the design of crew-couch, 
restraint-harness, and load-attenuation devices dictate that these components should 
be considered as  an integral subsystem. In addition, the design of the system should 
not be completed until the most significant interfaces with the vehicle are  defined be- 
cause the basic design concept is limited by the tolerance of the human body to impact 
loads. 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, July 12, 1973 
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